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in which Gigerenzer and colleagues used a Bayesian model in
order to constrain their heuristic solution, and we are not sure
how in practice this could help in the future. The underlying pro-
cesses of Bayesian models and heuristics are as different as could
be, and unless there are cases in which a Bayesian model pro-
vides important constraints on heuristic theories above and
beyond the data, we do not see the point.
With regard to Enlightened models of neural computation,
there is no evidence that neurons actually compute in a Baye-
sian manner. Almost all the evidence taken to support this
view is behavioural, with the computational neuroscience
largely devoted to providing existence proofs that Bayesian
computations in brain are possible. Accordingly, alternative
computational solutions might equally account for the relevant
data. More generally, J&L argue that an Enlightened Bayesian
model looks for optimal solutions, given a set of representations
and processes. However, we are unclear how this approach
adds to the more traditional approach to science, namely, eval-
uating how well a specific implemented model accounts for
performance.
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Abstract: If Bayesian Fundamentalism existed, Jones & Love’s (J&L’s)
arguments would provide a necessary corrective. But it does not.
Bayesian cognitive science is deeply concerned with characterizing
algorithms and representations, and, ultimately, implementations in
neural circuits; it pays close attention to environmental structure and
the constraints of behavioral data, when available; and it rigorously
compares multiple models, both within and across papers. J&L’s
recommendation of Bayesian Enlightenment corresponds to past,
present, and, we hope, future practice in Bayesian cognitive science.
The Bayesian Fundamentalist, as described by Jones & Love
(J&L), is an alarming figure. Driven by an unshakeable assump-
tion that all and every aspect of cognition can be explained as
optimal, given the appropriate use of Bayes’ rule, the fearsome
fundamentalist casts aside questions about representation and
procesFs, pays scant attention to the environment, and is rela-
tively unconcerned with empirical data or model comparison;
the fundamentalist launches an assault on the mind, armed
only with complex mathematics and elaborate computational
models. J&L suggest that cognitive science should shun this
extreme and bizarre position, and instead embrace Bayesian
Enlightenment. The latter is a moderate doctrine, which sees
Bayesian computational explanation as one of a number of
mutually constraining levels of explanation of the mind and
brain, pays attention to representation and process and the struc-
ture of the environment, and compares explanatory models with
empirical data and each other.
Readers new to Bayesian cognitive science may find the argu-
ment persuasive. The curious doctrine of Bayesian Fundament-
alism is surely a “bad thing,” and Bayesian Enlightenment is
clearly preferable. Such readers will, while being grateful to
J&L for forewarning them against the perils and pitfalls of Baye-
sian Fundamentalism, also wonder how a viewpoint as radical
and peculiar as Bayesian Fundamentalism ever became estab-
lished in the first place.
The truth is that it didn’t. To our knowledge, Bayesian Funda-
mentalism is purely a construct of J&L’s imagination. There are
no Bayesian Fundamentalists and never have been. There is, to
be sure, a large literature on Bayesian cognitive science. Bayesian
Fundamentalists appear nowhere within it. This is where the
reader of J&L new to Bayesian cognitive science is liable to be
led astray.
We agree with J&L that Enlightened Bayesians are commend-
able; and that Fundamentalist Bayesians, if they existed, would
be deplorable. But Bayesian Enlightenment, rather than Baye-
sian Fundamentalism, is and has always been the norm in Baye-
sian cognitive science.
Our discussion has four parts. First, we clarify some technical
inaccuracies in J&L’s characterization of the Bayesian approach.
Second, we briefly note that Bayesian Fundamentalism differs
from the actual practice of cognitive science along a number of
dimensions. Third, we outline the importance and potential
explanatory power of Bayesian computational-level explanation.
Fourth, we suggest that one characteristic of the Bayesian
approach to cognitive science is its emphasis on a top-down,
function-first approach to psychological explanation.
1. What is Bayes? In the target article, J&L worry that Baye-
sian inference is conceptually trivial, although its consequences
may be complex. The same could be said of all mathematical
science: The axioms are always “trivial”; the theorems and impli-
cations are substantive, as are the possibilities for engineering
nontrivial systems using that mathematics as the base.. J&L
focus their attention on Bayes’ rule, but this is just the starting
point for the approach, not its core. The essence of Bayes is
the commitment to representing degrees of belief with the calcu-
lus of probability. By adopting appropriate representations of a
problem in terms of random variables and probabilistic depen-
dencies between them, probability theory and its decision-theor-
etic extensions offer a unifying framework for understanding all
aspects of cognition that can be properly understood as inference
under uncertainty: perception, learning, reasoning, language
comprehension and production, social cognition, action planning
and motor control, as well as innumerable real-world tasks that
require the integration of these capacities. The Bayesian frame-
work provides a principled approach to solving basic inductive
challenges that arise throughout cognition (Griffiths et al.
2008a; Tenenbaum et al. 2011), such as the problem of trading
off simplicity and fit to data in model evaluation, via the Bayesian
Occam’s razor (MacKay 2002) or the problem of developing
appropriate domain-specific inductive biases for constraining
learning and inference, via hierarchical Bayesian models
(Gelman et al. 2003).
Bayes’ rule is the most familiar and most concrete form in
which psychologists typically encounter Bayesian inference, so
it is often where Bayesian modelers start as well. But interpreted
literally as the form of a computational model – what we take
to be J&L’s target when they refer to Bayes’ rule as a “simple
vote-counting scheme” (sect. 3, para. 9) – the form of Bayes’
rule J&L employ applies to only the simplest tasks requiring an
agent to evaluate two or more mutually exclusive discrete hypoth-
eses posited to explain observed data. Some of the earliest
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Bayesian models of cognition did focus on these cases; starting
with the simplest and most familiar settings is often a good
research strategy. But most of cognition cannot be directly cast
in such a simple form, and this has been increasingly reflected
in Bayesian cognitive models over the last decade. Indeed, the
form of Bayes’ rule that J&L discuss hardly figures in many con-
temporary Bayesian cognitive models.
What does it mean in practice for a computational model of
cognition to be Bayesian, if not to literally implement Bayes’
rule as a mechanism of inference? Typically, it means to adopt
algorithms for generating hypotheses with high posterior prob-
abilities based on Monte Carlo sampling, or algorithms for esti-
mating the hypothesis with highest posterior probability (i.e.,
maximum a posteriori probability [MAP]) using local message-
passing schemes (MacKay 2002). The outputs of these algorithms
can be shown, under certain conditions, to give reasonable
approximations to fully Bayesian inference, but can scale up to
much larger and more complex problems than could be solved
by exhaustively scoring all possible hypotheses according to
Bayes’ rule (J&L’s “simple vote-counting scheme”). A little
further on we briefly discuss several examples of how these
approximate inference algorithms have been explored as
models of how Bayesian computations might be implemented
in the mind and brain.
2. Bayesian Fundamentalism versus Bayesian cognitive
science. J&L charge Bayesian Fundamentalists with a number
of failings. The practice of Bayesian cognitive science is largely
free of these, as we will see.
(i) J&L suggest in their Introduction that “[i]t is extremely rare
to find a comparison among alternative Bayesian models of the
same task to determine which is most consistent with empirical
data” (sect. 1, para. 6). Yet such comparisons are commonplace
(for a tiny sample, see Goodman et al. 2007; Griffiths & Tenen-
baum 2009; Kemp & Tenenbaum 2009; Oaksford & Chater
2003); Goo. Nonetheless, of course, Bayesian authors do some-
times press for a single model, often comparing against non-
Bayesian alternative accounts (e.g., Goodman et al. 2008b).
This is entirely in line with practice in other modeling
frameworks.
(ii) J&L are concerned that Bayesians downplay the structure
of the environment. This is a particularly surprising challenge
given that Anderson’s path-breaking Bayesian rational analyses
of cognition (e.g., Anderson 1990; 1991a; Oaksford & Chater
1998b) are explicitly based on assumptions about environmental
structure. Similarly, Bayesian approaches to vision essentially
involve careful analysis of the structure of the visual environ-
ment – indeed, this defines the “inverse problem” that the
visual system faces (e.g., Yuille & Kersten 2006); and Bayesian
models of reasoning are crucially dependent on environmental
assumptions, such as “rarity” (Oaksford & Chater 1994).
Finally, in the context of language acquisition, there has been
substantial theoretical and empirical progress in determining
how learning depends on details of the “linguistic environment,”
which determine the linguistic structures to be acquired (Chater
& Vita´nyi 2007; Foraker et al. 2009; Hsu & Chater 2010; Hsu
et al., in press; Perfors et al. 2010; 2011).
(iii) J&L claim (in sect. 4) that Bayesian Fundamentalism is
analogous to Behaviorism, because it “eschews mechanism”
(sect. 2.2, para. 3). But, as J&L note, Bayesian cognitive
science, qua cognitive science, is committed to computational
explanation; behaviorists believe that no such computations
exist, and further that there are no internal mental states over
which such computations might be defined. Assimilating such
diametrically opposing viewpoints obscures, rather than illumi-
nates, the theoretical landscape.
(iv) J&L suggest, moreover, that Bayesians are unconcerned
with representation and process, and that the Bayesian
approach is driven merely by technical advances in statistics
and machine learning. This seems to us completely backwards:
Most of the technical advances have precisely been to enrich
the range of representations over which Bayesian methods
can operate (e.g., Goodman et al. 2011; Heller et al. 2009;
Kemp et al. 2010a; 2010b) and/or to develop new compu-
tational methods for efficient Bayesian inference and learning.
These developments have substantially expanded the range of
possible hypotheses concerning representations and algor-
ithms in human inference and learning. Moreover, some of
these hypotheses have provided new mechanistic accounts.
For example, Sanborn et al. (2010a, p.1144) have argued that
“Monte Carlo methods provide a source of ‘rational process
models’ that connect optimal solutions to psychological pro-
cesses”; related approaches are being explored in a range of
recent work (e.g., Vul et al. 2009a; 2009b). Moreover, there
has been considerable interest in how traditional psychological
mechanisms, such as exemplar models (Shi et al. 2010) and
neural networks (e.g., McClelland 1998; Neal 1992), may be
viewed as performing approximate Bayesian inference. Such
accounts have been applied to psychological data on, for
example, conditional reasoning (Oaksford & Chater 2010).
We have argued that Bayesian cognitive science as a whole is
closely involved both with understanding representation and
processes and with specifying environmental structure. Of
course, individual Bayesian projects may not address all
levels of explanation, and so forth. We believe it would be
unnecessary (and pernicious) to require each project to
embrace all aspects of cognition. (For instance, we would not
require all connectionist models to make explicit the bridge
to biological neural networks.) Indeed, according to the
normal canons of scientific inference, the more that can be
explained, with the fewer assumptions, the better. Thus,
contra J&L, we see it as a strength, rather than weakness, of
the Bayesian approach that some computational-level analyses
have broad applications across cognition, independent of
specific representational, processing, or environmental
assumptions, as we now explore.
3. The power of Bayesian computational-level explanation:
The case of explaining away. Consider the Bayesian analysis of
explaining away (Pearl 1988). Suppose two independent causes
(e.g., no petrol or dead battery) can cause a car not to start.
Learning that the car did not start then raises the probability of
both no petrol and dead battery: they both provide potential
explanations for the car not starting. But if we then learn that
the battery was dead, the probability of no petrol falls back to
its original value. The battery explains the car not starting; so
the apparent evidence that there might be no petrol is “explained
away.”
Experiments have found that, when given reasoning problems
with verbal materials, people do, indeed, follow this, and related,
patterns of reasoning (e.g., Ali et al. 2011), although this pattern
is clearer in young children (Ali et al. 2010), with adults imposing
additional knowledge of causal structure (Walsh & Sloman 2008;
Rehder & Burnett 2005). Moreover, the same pattern is ubiqui-
tous in perception: If a piece of sensory input is explained as part
of one pattern, it does not provide evidence for another pattern.
This principle emerges automatically from Bayesian models of
perception (Yuille & Kersten 2006).
Furthermore, explaining away also appears to help understand
how children and adults learn about causal regularities (e.g.,
Gopnik et al. 2004; Griffiths & Tenenbaum 2009). If a “blicket
detector” is triggered whenever A and B are present, there is a
prima facie case that A and/or B causes the detector to sound.
But if the detector also sounds when preceded only by A, then
this regularity explains away the sounding of the detector and
reduces the presumed causal powers of B. In animal learning,
a related pattern is known as blocking (Kamin 1969).
Blocking can also be explained using connectionist-style
mechanistic models, such as the Rescorla-Wagner model of
error-driven associative learning (Rescorla & Wagner 1972).
But such explanations fail to capture the fact that partial
reinforcement (i.e., where the putative effect only sometimes
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follows the putative cause) extinguishes more slowly than total
reinforcement. Indeed, partial reinforcement should induce a
weak link which should more easily be eliminated. From a Baye-
sian point of view, extinction in partial reinforcement is slower,
because the lack of effect must occur many times before there
is good evidence that the state of the world has really changed
(e.g., a causal link has been broken). This type of Bayesian analy-
sis has led to a wide range of models of human and animal learn-
ing, which are both compared extensively with each other and
with empirical data (for a review, see Courville et al. 2006).
Associative learning accounts of blocking also cannot explain
the rapid and complex dynamics observed in adults’ and chil-
dren’s causal learning: the fact that causal powers may be ident-
ified from just one or a few observed events in the presence of
appropriate background knowledge about possible causal mech-
anisms, and the strong dependence of the magnitude of causal
discounting on the base rates of causes in the environment (Grif-
fiths & Tenenbaum 2009). In contrast, these phenomena are not
only explained by, but were predicted by and then experimentally
verified from, the dynamics of explaining away in Bayesian ana-
lyses of causal learning.
We have seen that a general qualitative principle, explaining
away, which follows directly from the mathematics of probability,
has broad explanatory power across different areas of cognition.
This generality is possible precisely because the Bayesian analysis
abstracts away from mechanism – which presumably differs in
detail between verbal reasoning, perception, and human and
animal learning. Thus, contra J&L, the Bayesian approach is
not merely closely tied with empirical data; it provides a synthesis
across apparently unconnected empirical phenomena, which
might otherwise be explained by using entirely different
principles.
Framing explanations of some phenomena at this high level
of abstraction does not imply commitment to any kind of
Bayesian Fundamentalism. Rather, Bayesian cognitive scien-
tists are merely following the standard scientific practice of
framing explanation at the level of generality appropriate to
the phenomena under consideration. Thus, the details, across
computational, algorithmic, and implementation levels, of
accounts of animal learning, perception, or causal reasoning
will differ profoundly – but the phenomenon of “explaining
away” can insightfully be seen as applying across domains.
This aspect of explanation is ubiquitous across the sciences:
For example, an abstract principle such as the conservation of
energy provides a unified insight across a wide range of physical
phenomena; yet the application of such an abstract principle in
no way detracts from the importance of building detailed
models of individual physical systems.
4. Bayesian cognitive science as a top-down research
strategy. Bayesian cognitive scientists strongly agree with J&L
that it is vital to create mutually constraining accounts of cogni-
tion across each of Marr’s computational levels of explanation.
We stress that what is distinctive about the Bayesian approach,
in distinction from many traditional process models in cognitive
psychology, is a top-down, or “function-first” research strategy,
as recommended by Marr (1982): from computational, to algo-
rithmic, to implementational levels (see, e.g., Anderson 1990;
Chater et al. 2003; Griffiths et al. 2010).
The motivation for this approach is tactical, rather than ideo-
logical. Consider attempting to understand an alien being’s
pocket calculator that uses input and output symbols we
don’t understand. If we realize that an object is doing addition
(computational level), we have some chance of discerning
which type of representations and algorithms (algorithmic
level) might be in play; it is hard to see how any amount of
study of the algorithmic level alone might lead to inferences
in the opposite direction. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
how much progress could be made in understanding an algor-
ithm, without an understanding of what that algorithm is
computing.
Thus, the problem of reverse engineering a computational
system, including the human mind, seems to inevitably move
primarily from function to mechanism. Of course, constraints
between levels will flow in both directions (Chater & Oaksford
1990). The hardware of the brain will place strong constraints
on what algorithms can be computed (e.g., Feldman &
Ballard 1982), and the possible algorithms will place strong con-
straints on what computational-level problems can be solved or
approximated (Garey & Johnson 1979). Yet, from this reverse-
engineering perspective, the first task of the cognitive scientist
is to specify the nature of the computational problem that the
cognitive system faces, and how such problems might, in prin-
ciple, be solved. This specification typically requires, moreover,
describing the structured environment, the goal of the cognitive
system, and, frequently, computational constraints or represen-
tational commitments (Anderson 1990; Oaksford & Chater
1998b).
The appropriate mathematical frameworks used for this
description cannot, of course, be determined a priori, and will
depend on the nature of the problem to be solved. Analyzing
the problem of moving a multi-jointed motor system might, for
example, require invoking, among other things, tensor calculus
and differential geometry (which J&L mention as important to
developments in physics). A rational analysis of aspects of early
auditory and visual signal processing might invoke Fourier analy-
sis or wavelet transforms. A computational-level analysis of
language use might involve the application of symbolic gramma-
tical and computational formalism. In each case, the appropriate
formalism is also open to challenge: For example, researchers
differ widely concerning the appropriate grammatical or logical
formalism required to represent language and thought; or,
indeed, as to whether symbolic formalism is even required at
all (e.g., McClelland 2010).
Within this diversity, there is an important common math-
ematical thread. A wide range of cognitive problems, from
motor control to perception, language processing, and common-
sense reasoning, involve (among other things) making inferences
with uncertain information, for which probability theory is a
natural mathematical framework. For example, the problem of
finding an underlying pattern in a mass of sensory data –
whether that pattern be the layout of the environment, a set of
causal dependencies, the words, syntactic structure, or
meaning of a sentence, or even the grammatical structure of a
language – is naturally framed in terms of probabilistic (or Baye-
sian) inference. This explains why probability is a common theme
in Bayesian modeling, and why engineering approaches to
solving these and many other problems often take a Bayesian
approach (though there are important alternatives) (Bishop
1996; Manning & Schu¨tze, 1999; Russell & Norvig 2011).
Indeed, Bayesian cognitive scientists have themselves contribu-
ted to extending the boundaries of engineering applications in
some domains (e.g., Griffiths & Ghahramani 2006; Johnson
et al. 2007; Kemp & Tenenbaum 2008; Kemp et al. 2006;
Goodman et al. 2008a).
J&L are concerned that a close relationship between hypoth-
eses in Bayesian cognitive science and technical/mathematical
developments in engineering (broadly construed to include
statistics and computer science) may amount to a confusion
of “technical advances with theoretical progress” (sect. 1,
para. 3). We suggest, by contrast, that theoretical approaches
in cognitive science that are not tied to rich technical develop-
ments have little chance of success. Indeed, given that the
human mind/brain is the most complex mechanism known,
and that its information-processing capacities far outstrip
current artificial intelligence, it is surely inevitable that, in
the long term, successful reverse engineering will be possible
only in the light of spectacular technical developments, along-
side careful use of empirical data. We suggest that Bayesian
cognitive science promises to be a small forward step along
this path.
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